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Justice Brennan and the First Amendment
Minefield: In Respectful Appreciation
Ralph Michael Steint
Justice Brennan's retirement has occasioned numerous trib-
utes from academia and more will surely follow. The enduring
worth of William Brennan's constitutional faith will be analyzed,
discussed, debated and - as many of us hope - applied in
the coming years. Although no area of the Supreme Court's
caseload lacks the wisdom of Justice Brennan's insights, the area
of protected expressive activity, a concept that to Justice Bren-
nan meant so much more under the first amendment than the
usually-applied term "free speech" would indicate, benefitted
immeasurably from his long and devoted commitment.
It is a special privilege, and a personal joy, for me to have
the opportunity to contribute a piece honoring such a revered
figure. I make no claim to scholarly objectivity. My premise is
simple: William J. Brennan has given us a legacy of first amend-
ment decisions, concurrences, and dissents that reflect great
honor on the jurist. My portion of this Festschrift provides se-
lected examples of Justice Brennan's contribution, and con-
cludes by thanking him for serving, through his opinions, as a
mentor for me throughout my career as a teacher of constitu-
tional law.
First amendment law is a constitutional minefield, with an
array of unseen but inescapable problems, packed with present
and future explosive issues. Certain attributes of expressive ac-
tivity law, while seeming to establish principles that lend them-
selves to future application, actually create the basis for further
conflict and litigation. The Supreme Court's decisions in the
protected speech area incite partisan political attack and are
perceived to create divisiveness rather than foster harmony. The
constituency of the first amendment is broad in principle and
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fragmented in reality. Popular acceptance of and support for
first amendment decisions hinge more on the facts of a particu-
lar case than on an ideological or doctrinal commitment to the
amendment. While other areas of the law are fact specific, first
amendment cases are especially dependent on specific fact
situations.
Throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Bren-
nan more than trod on the constitutional minefield: he sought to
defuse it with a reasoned, humane jurisprudence. His majority
opinions enriched first amendment law and his dissents pro-
vided a continuous challenge to the majority's exposition of con-
stitutional law. Near the close of Justice Brennan's judicial ca-
reer, he authored two decisions that became the subject of
national, acrimonious, and sometimes vicious debate.
In the first case, Texas v. eohnson,1 the Court invalidated a
Texas statute that prohibited the willful destruction of vener-
ated objects, including, according to Texas authorities, the
American flag.2 Reversing Johnson's conviction, Justice Brennan
wrote a typically cogent opinion that patiently detailed the stat-
ute's vagueness and overbreadth. As is both so common and so
special with Justice Brennan's first amendment opinions, the
Johnson opinion provides an almost palpably calming lesson in
the value of protecting even the most loathsome expressive
behavior.
If the Johnson dissent can be characterized as strong and
personal, public and political reactions ranged from angry to
abusive. With considerable public support and the backing of
the President of the United States, Congress passed and the
President signed into law the Flag Protection Act of 1989.1 The
Act prohibited the destruction of the American flag while at-
tempting to avoid the fatal deficiencies of the overturned Texas
statute.
The Act's constitutionality was tested in the flag burners'
case, United States v. Eichman.5 The Eichman case drew great
1. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
2. Id. at 399.
3. Pub. L. 101-103, §§ 2,3, Oct. 28, 1989, 103 Stat. 77718, (codified at 18 U.S.C. §700
(1988)) (hereinafter the "Act").
4. Tex. Penal Code Ann. S42.09 (1989).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
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publicity and loudly voiced demands for a constitutional amend-
ment protecting the flag. The Court, which had decided the
Johnson case by a five to four margin, again struck down a very
popularly supported law.
Writing for the Court as a master of consensus, Justice
Brennan explained why, despite the attempts at legislative leg-
erdemain, the congressional response to Texas v. Johnson6 was
at least as flawed as the state statute it attempted to replace.
Justice Brennan's cogent statutory analysis detailed how the
federal law reflected Congress' intent to punish specific commu-
nicative activities. His analysis can be rejected by emotion but
not logic. Indeed, Justice Brennan appeared to gently chide
Congress. In his view, the more effort Congress expended to
make the statute appear content neutral, the more it reflected
Congress' actual and forbidden purpose - to punish flag de-
stroyers whose acts were not motivated by the age and deterio-
ration of the particular flag but by the intended message of their
actions.
The Eichman opinion could not have been easy for Justice
Brennan to write. As difficult as it was to invalidate the statute
in Texas v. Johnson,7 the flaws in the federal statute in Eich-
man were discernible even to opponents of the decision and, in
any event, striking down a congressional act is not quite the
same as invalidating a state statute. Eichman is a strong exposi-
tion of the first amendment architecture that Justice Brennan
built throughout his decades on the Court. To Justice Brennan,
the first amendment embodies the notion that the ability to
communicate and persuade is the very hallmark of both our con-
stitutional and our political concepts. The Eichman opinion is
remarkable for Justice Brennan's sensitivity to the passions
aroused by the case and his firmness in not allowing such pas-
sions to rule. As Justice Brennan wrote: "Punishing desecration
of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so
revered, and worth revering." 8
The roots of Justice Brennan's mature and reflective first
amendment philosophy, exemplified by the two flag burning
6. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
7. Id.
8. 110 S. Ct. at 2404.
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cases, can be found even in his early years on the Court. When
Justice Brennan joined the Court in 1956, the landmark desegre-
gation decisions in Brown v. Board of Education Is and Brown v.
Board of Education IP had already been decided. In the con-
text of protected speech and expressive conduct, however, the
Court was still very much in the thrall of the Cold War
mentality.
Before Justice Brennan's appointment, the Court had either
declined to review congressional and legal sanctions against per-
sons suspected of disloyalty or sustained them. The general dis-
crediting of professional "red hunters" had begun but was far
from complete; both Congress and the States were involved in
detecting and rooting out subversives. Given this political cli-
mate and Justice Brennan's junior status on the Court, it would
not have been surprising if he had joined the existing majority.
After all, Justices Holmes and Brandeis had done their share of
backtracking and reversing previously stated positions as they
explored the depth of first amendment challenges to government
loyalty and security operations and practices. However, Justice
Brennan made for himself a comfortable dissenting niche, and
began to attract supporters of his views.
On June 8, 1959, the Supreme Court decided two internal
security cases, Barenblatt v. United States" and Uphaus v.
Wyman."2 These cases illustrated Justice Brennan's purpose-ori-
ented approach to dissent, an activity in which he would soon
become a master."3 In Barenblatt, the Court sustained the peti-
tioner's conviction for contempt of Congress, finding that the pe-
titioner's interest in not revealing his past or present political
associations was outweighed by Congress' need to investigate
Communist subversion in the United States.' Justice Brennan
together with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas formed the dissenting bloc. Justice Black wrote the
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
12. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
13. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 82
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 127-129.
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Barenblatt dissent 8 to which Justice Brennan appended a one
paragraph supplement.16 In that one. paragraph, however, he
stated a principle to which he would often return: "An investiga-
tion in which the processes of law-making and law-evaluating
are submerged entirely in exposure of individual behavior - in
adjudication, of a sort, through the exposure process- is
outside the constitutional pale of congressional inquiry."' 7
The Barenblatt decision marked the beginning of Justice
Brennan's skepticism of governmental intrusion into privacy and
individuality. His skepticism was based on an ingrained distrust
of governmental motivations and the deleterious impact such
motivating factors had on the fabric of the first amendment.
In Uphaus, the same majority from Barenblatt upheld a
New Hampshire statute authorizing state investigations of sub-
versive activities.' The petitioner, who had been convicted of
civil contempt, challenged the statute on the grounds that fed-
eral law superseded it. The case had broad implications: the
Court's finding that federal law did not supersede the state stat-
ute was a green light for similar activities by other states.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent which was a mini-treatise
on the balancing test he believed had to be applied between a
government's duty to protect its citizens and the inherent and
inescapable limitations on the exercise of that duty as defined
and applied by rights-protective courts. Justice Brennan's dis-
sent was free of both rhetoric and jargon. It illustrated his clear
familiarity with the record and its logical dissection, the cogent
use of past cases, the erudite exposition of principles, and - of
great importance - an appreciation of the need to analyze and
predict results, both doctrinal and pragmatic.' 9
Cold War battles over the extent of first amendment insula-
tion from zealous government investigators evoked an increasing
number of dissents from Justice Brennan. In Communist Party
of U.S. v. Sub. Act. Cong. Bd.,20 the Court, with Justice Frank-
furter writing for the majority, upheld registration requirements
15. Id. at 134 (Black, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 166.
18. Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 81.
19. Id. at 81-82.
20. Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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promulgated by the government and directly applicable to the
petitioner.2 1 The Communist Party of the United States was not
a popular group, and in fact, the government's position was that
it was not even a political party according to the accepted defini-
tion of the term. Justice Brennan's dissent is a craftsmanly
amalgam of both substantive and procedural objections to the
Court's direction and its disposition of the case.22
Through the early 1960s, the pattern of Justice Brennan's
first amendment dissents continued. Each opinion contributed
to the shape of an evolving first amendment faith in which the
judiciary was unambiguously cast as the constitutional cowboy
riding in to save individuals and groups threatened with govern-
ment trial by exposure.
In the middle 1960s, however, Justice Brennan's first
amendment views began to command majority respect. The pro-
cess of vindicating essential expressive speech and conduct
rights was under way, implicitly contradicting relatively recent
Court pronouncements.2
As the years advanced, Justice Brennan was either in the
majority or the author of decisions that restricted government
intrusions on individual and group political activity under the
rubric of safeguarding internal security. As with his earlier dis-
sents, Justice Brennan's majority opinions invariably recognized
the scope of legitimate governmental interest while finding the
activity challenged to be overbroad, unsupported by the record,
or inherently repugnant to the free exchange of thoughts and
views.
Volumes will be written on Justice Brennan's first amend-
ment jurisprudence, but I would like to outline a few other areas
in which his perceptive view of the nation's crises contributed to
his development of the law of free speech and protected expres-
sive conduct. During the middle 1960s, Justice Brennan began to
put his mark on the difficult area of libel law. Traditionally an
area governed by state law, the law of libel increasingly impli-
21. Id. at 105.
22. Id. at 191.
23. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court, speaking
through Justice Brennan, found that a Louisiana statute that created and authorized
state internal security and investigations into subversive activities violated due process.
Id. at 494.
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cated first amendment values. If Justice Brennan had authored
no other libel law opinion, his opinion for the Court in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan2"' would ensure his reputation as a
defender of free speech. The Times standard of actual malice
which emerged from Justice Brennan's opinion 25 has been the
subject of hundreds of articles and a score of books, to say noth-
ing of subsequent case law treatment. Its continuing bedrock im-
portance is by itself a legacy to the Brennan years.
Justice Brennan has said that he can not name a favorite
opinion, but one I especially regard is his dissent in Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier2 6 The Hazelwood Court denied first
amendment protection to high school newspapers published by
students as part of a curricular program. Justice Brennan's un-
sparing dissent went beyond doctrinal analysis to indict the
Court for the far reaching and illogical harm the decision was
capable of producing.27 Justice Brennan stated that, by permit-
ting censorship at the high school level, the Court allowed
schools to evade the duty of preparing students to exercise the
very freedom implicit in the journalism-free press marketplace.2 8
During the Vietnam War, the Court considered numerous
cases in which first amendment rights were claimed to have been
subordinated to military requirements. In Greer v. Spock, 9,the
Court upheld the exclusion of protestors from Fort Dix, New
Jersey, a post that was open to the general public. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent virtually accused the majority of disingenuousness
in ignoring a trial record that showed that the post was no dif-
ferent from similar facilities that had been found to be public
fora. Justice Brennan's polite but nonetheless real impatience
with poorly reasoned opinions is especially apparent here.
Justice Brennan was one of the most prolific writers of dis-
senting opinions in cases in which the Court denied petitions for
certiorari. Most denials occasioned little judicial comment or
criticism, but Justice Brennan was alert to point out what he
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 279-83.
26. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
27. Id. at 277.
28. Id.
29. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
30. Id. at 851.
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viewed as missed opportunities to examine valid claims of con-
stitutional rights deprivation. For example, in 1985, the Court
denied a petition for certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local
School Dist. 1 As is usual, the summary denial by the Court
yielded no clue as to what the case was about, much less the
basis for declining review. In a lengthy memorandum dissent,
Justice Brennan persuasively argued that the petitioner, a bisex-
ual high school employee, was fired for revealing her sexual ori-
entation.32 She prevailed at the trial level, but the Court of Ap-
peals reversed,," finding that her statement about her sexual
preference was not a matter of public concern which would im-
plicate first amendment values. 4 Justice Brennan noted that the
legal issues raised by the Court of Appeals were unsettled. 5 He
noted that "this case starkly presents issues of individual consti-
tutional rights .... Petitioner did not lose her job because she
disrupted the school environment or failed to perform her job.
She was discharged merely because she is bisexual and revealed
this fact to acquaintances at her workplace."36 Justice Brennan
faulted the Court of Appeals' apparent disregard of clear evi-
dence in the trial record which he thought should have man-
dated affirmance. He also was prepared to tackle what he viewed
as an unresolved and pressing first amendment issue: "This case
poses the open question whether nondisruptive speech ever can
constitutionally serve as the basis for termination under the
First Amendment. 3 7 I doubt that readers familiar with Justice
Brennan's views wonder how he would have voted on the other
merits eventually had his colleagues in the majority granted
certiorari.
I suspect that most attorneys of Justice Brennan's genera-
tion are less than happy with the growth of attorney advertising,
which has proliferated since the Supreme Court struck down
barriers to the practice. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan did not
view the first amendment as failing to protect an activity he un-
31. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
32. Id. at 1018.
33. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 720 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 449.
35. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1011.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1013-14.
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doubtedly would never have engaged in. In Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 8 his majority opinion upheld the right of lawyers to
solicit business by writing truthful letters to potential clients.
The letter that was the subject of the case would have resulted
in instant disbarment a generation earlier, and reads much like a
subway car advertisement today. Although the letter did not re-
flect Justice Brennan's personal view of the role and proper de-
meanor of lawyers, he felt that it deserved first amendment pro-
tection. In applying constitutional protection to the petitioner's
solicitations, Justice Brennan demonstrated his understanding
of the changing nature of the practice of law and his ability to
objectively define rights based on long-articulated principles.
I conclude this tribute to Justice Brennan by reflecting on
the role he has played in my development as a teacher of consti-
tutional law. Justice Brennan's many opinions in all areas of the
law have been my yardstick to measure other jurists' opinions.
One of Justice Brennan's dissents, however, taught me much
and I wish to highlight the case.
In 1972, while I was in law school, the Court decided the
case of Laird v. Tatum 9 It was not a case in which I had, have,
or ever will have a totally objective viewpoint. The action was
based on information that a colleague and I had publicly re-
vealed regarding military intelligence surveillance of civilian po-
litical activity and the massive record keeping generated by that
operation. I had worked extensively with American Civil Liber-
ties Union's counsel in preparing for the case, and was slated to
be a main witness before the hearing on the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment.
The district court judge did not permit me, or anyone else,
to testify; he dismissed the action.4 0 A divided Court of Appeals
reversed and directed that an evidentiary hearing be held.4 1 The
government appealed to the Supreme Court and under the cloak
of determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court de-
cided the case in favor of the government on the merits.2 It was
38. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
39. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
40. Laird v. Tatum, 444 F.2d 947, 949 (1971).
41. Id. at 958-59.
42. Laird, 408 U.S. at 10.
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a bitter day for me and for many others who believed that we
could clearly establish the existence of an ongoing and harmful
civilian intelligence operation maintained by the Army if we had
the evidentiary hearing we believed was minimally our due.
Adding to our anger and outrage was the fact that the
Court's decision was a five - four split with the swing vote com-
ing from the newest member, Justice William Rehnquist.
Justice Douglas wrote a strong and passionate dissent 43
which I then thought was just about the finest piece of judicial
writing I had ever seen. It invoked history, tradition, and law,
and it treated our case as virtually proven, a stand we could
hardly take ourselves. Justice Brennan, by contrast, wrote a very
short dissent," two thirds of which was a direct quotation from
the Court of Appeals' opinion overturning the trial court." I was
not impressed, and I remember remarking to classmates that
Justice Brennan appeared to be a narrow proceduralist while
Justice Douglas enunciated clear constitutional principles and a
thorough understanding of our case.
Of course, I have discussed Laird v. Tatum in every semes-
ter of my constitutional law course, naturally with fair disclaim-
ers about my lack of total objectivity. During my first few years
of teaching, I recall emphasizing Justice Douglas' dissent while
virtually ignoring Justice Brennan's. Then, about a dozen years
ago, a student asked me why I was scornful of the Court's treat-
ment on the merits of a case in which no evidence had been
presented while being uncritical of Justice Douglas's acceptance
of the plaintiffs' claims based on the same unsupported record.
This observation led me to reappraise Justice Brennan's contri-
bution. I have no doubt how he would have voted if the case had
properly arrived before the Court on a full record. On the evi-
dence, he would have been as outraged at the Army's activities
as Justice Douglas had been without the benefit of evidence
sifted and examined through the adversary process. I will not
say that I was any less fond of Justice Douglas, a magnificent
man. I finally saw, however, the wisdom of Justice Brennan's
dissent which demonstrated his awareness that the lower courts
43. Id. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 38-40.
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had said all that had to be said and that further comment was
unnecessary and unwise.
The legacy of William Brennan will reach future generations
of Americans. He was one of the few members of the High Court
to whom the much-overused appellation, "great", is a true
understatement.
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